8 found
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Philip R. Sullivan [7]Philip Richard Sullivan [1]
  1.  50
    Objects limit human comprehension.Philip Richard Sullivan - 2009 - Biology and Philosophy 24 (1):65-79.
    This paper demonstrates that the human visual system, the primary sensory conduit for primates, processes ambient energy in a way that obligatorily constructs the objects that we ineluctably perceive. And since our perceptual apparatus processes information only in terms of objects (along with the properties and movements of objects), we are limited in our ability to comprehend ‘what is’ when we move beyond our ordinary world of midsize objects—as, for example, when we address the micro microworld of quantum physics.
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  2. Contentless consciousness and information-processing theories of mind.Philip R. Sullivan - 1995 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (1):51-59.
    Functionalist theories of mind sometimes have viewed consciousness as emerging simply from the computational activity of extremely complex information-processing systems. Empirical evidence suggests strongly, however, that experiences without content ("pure consciousness" events, or "core mystical experience") and devoid of subjectivity (no sense of agency or ownership) do happen. The occurrence of such consciousness, lacking all informational content, counts against any theory that equates consciousness with the mere "flow of information," no matter how intricate.
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  3.  68
    Are current philosophical theories of consciousness useful to neuroscientists?Philip R. Sullivan - 2006 - Behavior and Philosophy 34:59-70.
    Two radically different families of theory currently compete for acceptance among theorists of human consciousness. The majority of theorists believe that the human brain somehow causes consciousness, but a significant minority holds that how the brain would cause this property is not only currently incomprehensible, but unlikely to become comprehensible despite continuing advances in brain science. Some of these latter theorists hold an alternate view that consciousness may well be one of the fundamentals in nature, and that the extremely complex (...)
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  4.  22
    Murphy's Law and the Natural Ought.Philip R. Sullivan & Phillip R. Sullivan - 1995 - Behavior and Philosophy 23 (3-1):39 - 49.
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  5.  15
    Overriding the Natural Ought.Philip R. Sullivan & Phillip R. Sullivan - 1996 - Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):129 - 136.
    Natural selection favors not only more adaptive structural features but also more effective behavioral programs. Crucial for the prospering and very survival of an extremely sophisticated social species like homo sapiens is the biological/psychological program that might be conveniently labeled the human sense of fairness: a feeling often referred to in societies featuring supernaturalized explanations as one's "God given conscience." The sense of fairness and related programs derive a measure of their effectiveness from the fact that, in addition to the (...)
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  6.  36
    Physicians and the problem of other consciousnesses.Philip R. Sullivan - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):115-123.
  7.  8
    Physicians and the Problem of Other Consciousnesses.Philip R. Sullivan - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):115-123.
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  8.  13
    Review: Philosophical Psychopathology. [REVIEW]Philip R. Sullivan - 1996 - Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):175 - 180.